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The received view in Chomskian linguistics is that linguistic 
intuitions are the product of a linguistic competence residing in a 
sub-central module of the mind. In Ignorance of Language I 
rejected this “Voice of Competence” view (“VoC”), and gave an 
answer of my own. I argued that intuitions are empirical theory-
laden central-processor responses to phenomena. This led to an 
exchange with Nenad Miščević in which he defended VoC. 
Miščević has since returned to the issue, criticizing my sort of view, 
which he labels “ordinarism”. Dunja Jutronić has already given 
an excellent response to these criticisms. I focus on revising and 
developing my view further. I emphasize that a person’s linguistic 
intuitions can be immediate perceptual judgments that do not arise 
from any conscious and deliberate exercise of her own competence. 
Should she feel the need for such an exercise, she is likely to begin 
with an understanding test not a production one. The mental 
processes involved in these deliberate tests are not aptly described 
as “simulations” of linguistic usage. !
Keywords: linguistic usage, Voice of Competence, Modest 
Explanation, theory-laden, simulation, the understanding test, the 
production test !
I am very pleased to have been invited to contribute to this volume in 
honor of Nenad Miščević. I first met Nenad in Dubrovnik in 1989 and we 
have been friends ever since. As a result of the work of Nenad, and our 
mutual friend Dunja Jutronić, I have been to so many conferences and 
workshops, given so many talks, in Croatia that I feel part of Croatian 
philosophy! Over these 25 years, I have noticed the enormous 
development of analytic philosophy in Croatia, something for which 
Nenad surely deserves a great deal of the credit. Finally, I should like to 
say how much I admire Nenad’s steadfast and principled opposition to 
the various nationalisms that have caused such grievous harm to the 
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1. Introduction !
Linguistics takes the intuitions that people have about the syntactic and 
semantic properties of the language that they speak as good evidence for 
a theory of that language. Why are these intuitions good evidence? In my 
book, Ignorance of Language (2006a, ch. 7; also 2006b), I rejected the 
received Chomskian answer, which I somewhat playfully called “Voice of 
Competence” (“VoC”), and gave an answer of my own.  In response, 1
Nenad came to the defense of VoC in the Croatian Journal of Philosophy 
(2006). I replied (2006c).  Nenad (2009) has taken up the issue again in a 2
paper in honor of Dunja Jutronić, with a follow up (2012), labeling the 
sort of view that she and I urge, I’m sorry to say, “ordinarism”. Jutronić 
has given an excellent response (this volume) and so I can be fairly brief 
in my own. !
2. Voice of Competence (VoC) !
What is VoC? Consider the intuitive judgments that 
(1) John seems to Bill to want to help himself 
is a grammatical/acceptable  sentence, and that in it ‘himself’ co-refers 3
with ‘John’. VoC is the view that these intuitions are the product of a 
linguistic competence residing in a sub-central module of the mind. I 
describe VoC as the view that linguistic competence, all on its own, 
provides information about the linguistic facts….So these 
judgments are not arrived at by the sort of empirical investigation 
that judgments about the world usually require. Rather, a speaker 
has a privileged access to facts about the language, facts captured 
by the intuitions, simply in virtue of being competent…(2006a, 96)  
8
 The evidential role of intuitions in the philosophy of language, for example, in the 1
theory of reference, is even more prominent than in linguistics; indeed, philosophers seem 
to rely on nothing else. Mostly, philosophers seem to think that these intuitions are a priori 
(McKinsey 1987, 1). However, philosophers may implicitly embrace the more respectable 
VoC. On this, see Stich 1996, Devitt 2012 and 2015.
 This paper also replied to other critics of my discussion of intuitions: Collins 2006, 2
Matthews 2006, Rattan 2006, Rey 2006 and Smith 2006. There have been some later 
critics: Pietroski 2008, responded to in Devitt 2008; Textor 2009, responded to in Devitt 
2010a; Culbertson and Gross 2009, which led to the exchange, Devitt 2010b, Gross and 
Culbertson 2011; Fitzgerald 2010, responded to in Devitt 2010b; Ludlow 2011 and Rey 
2013, responded to in Devitt 2013.
 Linguists have recently made much of the distinction between intuitions about 3
grammaticality and about acceptability, far too much in my view (2010b, 839-44). I argue 
that ordinary acceptability intuitions are evidence only insofar as they are grammaticality 
intuitions; see Gross and Culbertson 2011 for a response.
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On this view, competence not only plays the dominant role in linguistic 
usage, it also provides informational content to metalinguistic intuitions. 
Those intuitions are indeed, “noise” aside, the voice of competence. That 
is why they are reliable. 
I cited a great deal of evidence that VoC is the received Chomskian view 
(2006a, 96).  The following passage from Chomsky is particularly 4
striking evidence: 
it seems reasonably clear, both in principle and in many specific 
cases, how unconscious knowledge issues in conscious 
knowledge...a person has unconscious knowledge of the principles 
of binding theory, and from these and others discussed, it follows 
by computations similar to straight deduction that in [I wonder who 
the men expected to see them] the pronoun them may be 
referentially dependent on the men whereas in [The men expected 
to see them] it may not…That this is so is conscious knowledge”. 
(1986, 270) 
Nenad (2009) expresses his commitment to VoC nicely in discussing the 
following pair of sentences: 
(W) They want to be teachers. 
(W*) *They want to be teacher. 
Here is his commitment: 
Imagine a native speaker, Ann, accepting the first and rejecting the 
second. Certainly, Ann sort of rehearsed the sentences in her inner 
fore, asking herself whether she would say them, simulating actual 
saying, as the standard description goes. So, how is Ann’s 
cognitive apparatus arriving to the verdict? Following the lead 
from the Chomskian tradition, I would claim that it is mobilizing 
the particular competence, i.e. the same cognitive resource that 
produces or fails to produce similar sentences in real-life speaking. 
It is the competence itself that is doing the work, the central 
processor at best just passively reports the verdict of the 
competence, which is the intuition. 
I have argued that VoC is wrong (2006a,b; 2010b; 2013). I shall 
summarize my objections in section 4. But perhaps the best reason for 
rejecting VoC, is that there is a better explanation of intuitions and their 
evidential role.  
9
 I thought that the evidence for this attribution was overwhelming and so was surprised to 4
find three knowledgeable philosophers rejecting the attribution: John Collins (2008, 
17-19), Gareth Fitzgerald (2010), and Peter Ludlow (2011, 69-71). I have responded to 
Fitzgerald (Devitt 2010b, 845-7) and to Ludlow (Devitt 2013, 274-8). Ludlow’s 
discussion is notable for its egregious misrepresentation of the evidence. I have also 
provided more evidence (2013, 273) in the works of Barry Smith (2006), Mark Textor 
(2009), and Georges Rey (2013). I still think that the evidence is overwhelming. But see 
Jeffrey Maynes and Steven Gross (2013) for a nice discussion of the matter.
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3. “Ordinarism” !
If VoC is not the right theory of intuitions, what is? I argue that intuitive 
judgments about language, like intuitive judgments in general, “are 
empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to phenomena, 
differing from many other such responses only in being fairly immediate 
and unreflective, based on little if any conscious reasoning” (2006a, 103). 
Although a speaker’s competence in a language obviously gives her 
ready access to the data of that language, the data that the intuitions are 
about, it does not give her ready access to the truth about the data; the 
competence does not provide the informational content of the intuition. 
In this respect my view is sharply different from VoC. And it is sharply 
different in another respect: it is modest, making do with cognitive states 
and processes we were already committed to. This led Mark Textor 
(2009) to call it “the Modest Explanation”. 
This is the sort of view that Nenad (2009) ascribes to Jutronić and me and 
calls “ordinarism”: 
Roughly, the ordinarist hopes that the contribution of the 
competence is minimal, and the holistic contribution of CP [central 
processor] maximal and essential. For her, intuitions are basically 
the products of holistic theorizing, not of special, dedicated 
competence. This is why they are not special, why they contain so 
much empirical material, and why it is wrong to take them to be a 
priori. 
Nenad characterizes the ordinarinist as holding that intuitions are 
“products of holistic theorizing”. This needs to be taken with caution. It is 
prompted by my talk of intuitions as “theory-laden”. Nenad 
misunderstood this initially (2006, 539; cf. Devitt 2006c, 595) and may 
still do so. The idea is not that these intuitions are theoretical judgments 
or the result of theorizing. Rather, the intuitions are mostly the product of 
experiences of the linguistic world. They are like “observation” 
judgments; indeed, some of them are observation judgments (2006a, 
103). As such, they are “theory-laden” in just the way that we commonly 
think observation judgments are. The anti-positivist revolution in the 
philosophy of science, led by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, drew 
our attention to the way in which even the most straightforward 
judgments arising from observational experiences may depend on a 
background. We would not make the judgments if we did not hold certain 
beliefs or theories, some involving the concepts deployed in the 
judgments. We would not make the judgments if we did not have certain 
predispositions, some innate but many acquired in training, to respond 
selectively to experiences.  5
10
 So ‘theory’ in ‘theory-laden’ has to be construed very broadly to cover not just theories 5
proper but also these dispositions.
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A few more points about this theory ladenness may be appropriate. (a) 
The power of the background to influence judgments should not be 
exaggerated. Thus a person observing the Müller-Lyer arrows will judge 
that one “looks longer” than the other even though she knows perfectly 
well that they are the same length. (b) The view is not that we 
consciously bring the background into play in a way that amounts to 
theorizing about the experience. Surely, we mostly don’t. Nonetheless, 
the background plays a causal role in the judgment. (c) The view is not 
that we need to have done a deal of thinking about language before 
having linguistic intuitions: a thoroughly ignorant person may learn to 
have intuitions in an experimental situation (2006a, 114).  6!
4. The Rejection of VoC !
So why should we prefer ordinarism to VoC? What’s wrong with VoC? I 
have recently summed up my former criticisms of VoC (2006a,b; 2010b; 
2013) as follows:  
The main problems with it are, first, that, to my knowledge, it has 
never been stated in the sort of detail that could make it a real 
theory of the source of intuitions. Just how do the allegedly 
embodied principles yield the intuitions? We need more than a 
hand wave in answer. Second, again to my knowledge, no 
argument has ever been given for VoC until Georges Rey’s recent 
attempt (2013) which, I argue (2013), fails. Third, given what else 
we know about the mind, it is unlikely that VoC could be 
developed into a theory that we would have good reason to believe. 
(2015, 37)  7
Should I revise this assessment in light of Nenad’s “Competent 
Voices” (2009)? 
Well, concerning the first point, Nenad has, with his flow-chart, provided 
a bit more than a hand wave to explain how the allegedly embodied 
principles yield the intuitions. But it seems to me only a very little bit 
more and not nearly enough. We need an account of how Ann’s 
competence which, we are supposing, produces strings like (W) but not 
(W*),  also “comes out with some kind of answer, some Yes or No 8
signal” about the acceptability of these strings. How does competence  
11
 I claim that this is the way to view intuitions of the ignorant in the ingenious ‘minimal 6
pair’ experiments (2006a, 110).
 Maynes and Gross propose a possible defense of VoC (2013). For discussion, see Devitt 7
2013.
 I’ll go along with this view of (W*) but I rather doubt that it is true. In children’s doctor-8
nurse games, we might properly say of Fiona, “She wants to be doctor”. Similarly in 
school games, we might properly say of several children, “They want to be teacher”.
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move from (1) in the flow-chart to the “immediate spontaneous answer” 
of (2)? Why should we even suppose that there is such a move? I don’t 
see any explanation in Nenad’s discussion. 
Concerning the second point, Nenad (2009, 2012) has produced an 
argument for VoC and against ordinarism, to his great credit. But, in my 
view, Jutronić (this volume) shows that this argument fails. 
So far as I can see, Nenad has not addressed my third point, a point also 
emphasized by Jutronić: whichever way VoC is understood, given what 
else we know about the mind, VoC seems most unlikely to be true. 
I have also drawn attention to some other implausibilities of VoC 
(2006a,b; 2010b; 2013) which I have recently summed up as follows: 
(i) If competence really spoke to us, why would it not use the 
language of the embodied theory and why would it say so 
little? 
(ii) There would be a disanalogy between the intuitions provided 
by the language faculty and by perceptual modules. 
(iii) Developmental evidence suggests that the ability to speak a 
language and the ability to have intuitions about the language 
are quite distinct, the former being acquired in early childhood, 
the latter, in middle childhood as part of a general cognitive 
development. (2015, 37) 
An argument for VoC should confront these implausibilities. !
5. Developing Ordinarism !
My account in Ignorance (2006a) of intuitive judgments was criticized by 
Nenad (2006). I was grateful for the criticism because it made me aware 
of a careless error and led to a development of the view (2006c). I’m 
grateful now for Nenad’s latest criticism (2009). In this section I shall 
conclude my paper by revising and developing ordinarism further, 
stimulated by this criticism. 
The beginning of my account of how a normal competent speaker makes 
a grammaticality judgment about an expression included the following: 
she appreciates the connection between…grammaticality and 
competence in the language: roughly, errors aside, competent 
speakers produce and understand grammatical sentences. She 
knows that she is a competent speaker and so uses herself as a 
guide to what the competent speaker would do. So she asks herself 
whether this expression is something she would say and what she 
would make of it if someone else said it. (2006a, 109)  
12
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Before getting to his criticism, Nenad gives an interestingly different 
account of how a speaker begins the process leading to her intuitive 
judgment: she “might try to say the target sentence to herself, she 
engages in a ‘tentative production’, sometimes described as ‘simulation’” 
(2006, 526). So, where I talk of the speaker questioning herself about 
both the production and the understanding of the expression, Nenad talks 
only of production. And Nenad introduces talk of “simulation”.  
I now think that both these aspects of Nenad’s account are mistaken, for 
reasons I will give in a moment. Before that, however, I must give two 
developments that I have already made to my ordinarism.  
I have already mentioned the first development: it was in response to 
Nenad’s earlier criticism. In this response, I adopted Nenad’s talk of 
“simulation” that I now think mistaken: 
So, in the typical situation, an ordinary person asked about a 
certain string of words will first simulate the behavior of 
attempting to produce or understand the string, thus exercising her 
linguistic competence. She will then go in for some quick central- 
processor reflection upon this experience, deploying her concept of 
grammaticality, acceptability, or whatever from folk linguistics, to 
form a judgment. The judgment itself is propositional, of course, 
but the datum for the judgment is not. The datum is the experience 
of simulating the behavior, which is no more propositional than is 
an experience of actually producing or understanding a string in 
normal language use (pp. 109–11). So competence supplies the 
datum for the intuition, the central processor provides the intuition. 
(2006c, 594) 
The second development was in response to Textor (2009) and continued 
with the talk of “simulation”. I found the just-quoted story of intuition 
formation a bit misleading: 
the story I have just told may indeed capture the typical way for a 
speaker to form an intuition in response to a difficult case but it 
surely does not for a speaker in response to an easy case. Consider 
the strings, ‘responded the quickly speaker’ and ‘the speaker 
responded quickly’, for example. The speaker is likely to recognize 
immediately, without reflecting on any simulation, that the former 
word salad is unacceptable and the latter simple sentence is 
acceptable. If so, her intuition is, in this respect, analogous to some 
other ones I have mentioned in the past: a paleontologist 
responding to a bit of white stone sticking through grey rock with 
‘‘a pig’s jawbone’’; art experts correctly judging an allegedly sixth-
century Greek marble statue to be a fake; the tennis coach, Vic 
Braden, correctly judging a serve to be a fault before the ball hits 
the ground [(2006a, 104; 2006b, 492).] Just as the paleontologist, 
the art expert, and Vic Braden, immediately recognize the relevant  
13
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property in these cases, so too does the speaker in easy linguistic 
cases. There is no need for her to go through the experience of 
trying to produce or understand the string. (2010a, 254-5) 
What I am emphasizing here is that a person’s linguistic intuitions are 
perceptual judgments that can be as immediate as those of the art expert 
and Braden, without the conscious and deliberate exercise of her 
competence in what, following Nenad, I am here calling “simulations”. 
Just as the paleontologist’s, art expert’s, and Braden’s years of experience 
and education have made them quick at deploying their concepts of pig’s 
jawbone, fake, and fault, respectively, so too a speaker’s years of 
experience and education is likely to make her quick at wielding her 
concept of grammaticality, at least in simple cases. Thus Ann may well 
arrive at her intuitions about (W) and (W*) without needing the help of a 
“simulation”. 
The following example, popular in discussions of linguistic intuitions 
(see, for example, Fitzgerald 2010, 139), both exemplifies such 
immediate perceptual judgments and shows that they can be wrong: 
Many more people have been to France than I have. 
When a competent speaker is presented with this she is likely to judge 
immediately that it is grammatical. Yet it isn’t, as will become apparent to 
her as soon as she tests it against her own competence in what we are 
calling a “simulation”: this string of words simply makes no sense. 
A word of caution is necessary here. To say that a speaker may perceive 
that a string has a certain syntactic property without a conscious and 
deliberate exercise of her competence, without a “simulation”, is not to 
say that her competence is not involved in her perception. As Fodor has 
pointed out, “you can’t help hearing an utterance of a sentence (in a 
language you know) as an utterance of a sentence” (1983, 52-3).  9
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 I am indebted to Georges Rey for reminding me of this important Fodorian point. Rey 9
has emphasized it before, taking it as evidence for VoC and against my Modest 
Explanation (2013). I don’t think that it is. Thus, after saying that I accept the point, I go 
on: 
And Rey has me wrong in supposing that I find remarks like the following 
“implausible”: “speech perception involves…a highly modularized perception of 
linguistic features of the speech vehicles themselves”; “we hear the utterances of a 
language we know in terms of [morphemic constituency, syntactic structure and 
logical form]” (2013, 254-5). In understanding (1) [“John seems to Bill to want to 
help himself”], we hear it as having those linguistic features and not others in that, 
as a result of all the processing in the language system, we come up with a 
representation that has those features and not others; for example, it has a feature 
that takes ‘himself’ to co-refer with ‘John’ not ‘Bill. What I do find very 
implausible is that, in hearing (1) in this way, the central processor thereby has the 
informational basis for the intuitive judgment that ‘himself’ co-refers with ‘John’. 
We have been given no reason to believe that. Hearing an utterance in a certain 
way is one thing, judging that it has certain properties, another. (2013, 286-7)
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So because of Ann’s English competence she is almost certain to hear 
(W) as a sentence, “automatically”, and may then, partly as a result of 
that experience, make the immediate perceptual judgment that it is 
grammatical. And she is almost certain to hear (W*) as a string of words 
but not a sentence, “automatically”, and may then, partly as a result of 
that experience, make the immediate perceptual judgment that it is 
ungrammatical. But this automatic engagement of her competence is not 
to be confused with a “simulation”.  10
It follows from this that my earlier discussions (2006a,b,c) were 
mistakenly focused only on cases where a person’s linguistic intuitions 
arose from reflecting on a conscious and deliberate exercise of her own 
competence. Nenad’s discussion makes a similar mistake. Intuitions may 
be formed immediately in the CP (central processor) simply on the basis 
of perception of a string. 
I turn now to my criticisms of two aspects of Nenad’s discussion of 
intuition formation: (a) his talk of producing the string in question but not 
of understanding it; (b) his description of the process as a “simulation”. 
Consider (a). Suppose that when Ann is asked about (W) and (W*) she 
does not immediately perceive the answer and decides to test these 
strings against her own competence. One thing she will surely do is 
consciously try to understand the strings in just the same way as she 
would any string presented in conversation that she had difficulty with. 
She may go further, of course, and produce the strings, saying them to 
herself or out loud. But she will surely begin with the understanding test. 
Consider (b) and, first, the understanding test. Since Nenad does not 
mention this test, he obviously does not describe it as “simulating” an 
attempt at understanding. But I did so describe it. I said that a person 
“will first simulate the behavior of attempting to produce or understand 
the string” (2006c, 594). This now strikes me as a mistake. In executing 
the understanding test on (W) and (W*), Ann will deliberately go through 
a process of understanding of the sort that she goes through 
“automatically” when presented with a string in normal conversation. 
This is a straightforward exercise of her linguistic competence. It is an 
actual attempt at understanding, not a simulated attempt. Ann will then 
reflect on this attempt, deploying her concept of grammaticality in her CP 
to come up with an intuitive judgment.  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 It is a mark of a skill that it is “automatic” in this way: it can be performed whilst 10
attention is elsewhere (Anderson 1980, 230-5; Reisberg 1999, 460). So I see the 
“automaticity” of linguistic usage as part of the evidence that linguistic competence is 
simply a skill (2006a, 210).
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Consider (b) and, second, the production test. This test is not aptly called 
a “simulation” either. For, what could the test for a word salad like 
‘responded the quickly speaker’ be simulating? Certainly not a piece of 
language production. For, in language production a person’s competence 
produces a string to express a thought. So to simulate that process would 
be to take some thought and go through the motions of expressing it 
without actually expressing it, as in acting or rehearsing. That is a very 
different process from the production test. Thus, in saying ‘responded the 
quickly speaker’ to oneself or out loud, there is no thought that the person 
simulates expressing. Indeed, what could the thought be?! Rather, the 
person’s CP, not her English competence, produces the word salad: the 
person deliberately repeats the string that has been presented to her. This 
is not to say, of course, that her English competence plays no causal role 
in the production. Because of that competence she will first hear the 
string as a string of words and so she will repeat it as a string of words. 
But the CP is what produces it, just as it would a repetition of another 
person’s wave, giggle, utterance in a foreign language, or any other 
action. Her CP is causally responsible for such behaviors. 
What happens after she repeats the string? It is not too clear. She needs to 
discover whether, as a competent speaker, she would ever produce this 
string. But how will she tell? It rather looks as if the person will check 
whether she, as a competent speaker, understands the string she has 
repeated. She will then reflect on this experience. If this is right, the 
production test collapses into an understanding test. And, once again, 
there is no simulation. 
The inappropriateness of talk of simulation in describing this production 
test is brought home by the contrast between this test and a production 
test that does involve a simulation: 
Touch-typing provides a nice example of reflecting on the output 
of one’s own competence. Ask a touch-typist whether a ‘k’ should 
be typed with a middle finger and, very likely, he will think to 
himself, ‘‘How would I type a ‘k’?’’ He will attend as he goes 
through the actual or mental motions of doing so and respond 
immediately, ‘‘Yes’’. (2006a, 106) 
In this case, the act of typing a ‘k’ is simulated. In the language case, the 
act of expressing a thought by a word salad is not. 
In sum, a speaker may make her intuitive judgments about a string 
immediately in perception, without reflecting on any conscious and 
deliberate exercise of her own competence. And she is likely to do so in 
easy cases. Should she feel the need for such an exercise, she is likely to 
start with an understanding test rather than a production one. The mental 
processes involved in these tests are not aptly described as “simulations” 
of linguistic usage.  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In Ignorance I described a person’s behavior in the linguistic tests as 
follows: “she asks herself whether this expression is something she would 
say and what she would make of it if someone else said it” (2006a, 109). 
This is too brief but it is right for difficult cases. I shouldn’t have let 
Nenad lead me into talk of simulations. 
Finally, I turn to one of Nenad’s latest criticisms (2009). (I am leaving the 
others to Jutronić.) The criticism is of my talk of experience in describing 
my tests: 
The experience, as made clear by the context, is “the experience of 
simulating the behavior” (2006, 594, the body of the text), i.e. the 
neural-verbal behavior of producing or trying to produce the target 
string. 
This is hard to believe. First, subpersonal experiences hopefully 
don’t have qualitative character, so the experience of producing the 
string is just the very producing. Suppose competence thus 
produces the string, and the CP takes this producing as its datum; it 
is almost like CP watching the competence producing the string. 
But what kind of information can this give to the CP? 
I would no longer talk of simulations, of course. Beyond that, I have three 
responses. 
(1) In an understanding test, a speaker is consciously aware of the 
difference between understanding a string and not understanding it.  In a 11
production test, a speaker is consciously aware of repeating the string and 
then, it seems, seeing if she understands it. By “experience” I simply 
have in mind these mental processes of which the person is thus 
consciously aware. The person having these experiences goes on to judge 
whether they are of something grammatical. Such perceptual judgments 
are likely to be quite reliable for she will have acquired her ability to 
deploy her concept of grammaticality by reflecting on such experiences. 
(2) We might metaphorically describe reflecting on experiences in the 
understanding test as “watching the competence attempt to understand a 
string” but we should not describe reflecting on experiences in the 
production test as “watching the competence producing the string”. For, 
as just noted, the competence does not produce the string, the CP does. 
So, the first stage of Nenad’s flow-chart for the production test is wrong: 
there is no “tentative production (by competence)”. 
(3) Perception of the string, with or without an understanding or 
production test, provides information to a speaker’s CP about the 
properties of the string in just the same way that perception of a white 
stone, marble statue, and serve provide information to a paleontologist, 
art expert, and Vic Braden about the properties of their respective entities.  
17
 For more on what might go on in this test, see Devitt 2013, 287-8.11
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Perception, perhaps accompanied by some introspection, is a way of 
learning about the world. 
My thanks to Nenad for prompting this revision and for further 
development of my view.  12!!
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